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WOULD OUTSOURCING INCREASE OR DECREASE WAGE INEQUALITY?  TWO MODELS, 
TWO ANSWERS 
 




This paper develops two models to study the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labor in the developed country and the developing country.  The first model 
assumes symmetric production technologies in both countries, and predicts that outsourcing will 
increase wage inequality in the developed country, but decrease wage inequality in the developing 
country.  The second model assumes asymmetric technologies in the production of the 
intermediate good and predicts that outsourcing can lead to an increase in wage inequality in both 
the developed country and the developing country. 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
In the past few decades, the widening of the wage gap has been observed in many countries 
including some developing countries.  During the same period, the world economy has become 
increasingly integrated through the rapid expansion of trade in intermediate goods (outsourcing) as 
well as in final goods.   Has the growth in outsourcing and in final-goods trade contributed to the 
rise in wage inequality?  This is a significant policy issue that has generated considerable debate.   
However, the debate to date appears to have focused on the relationship between trade (in final 
goods) and wage inequality, and the impact of outsourcing has received little attention (Feenstra 
and Gordon, 1996). 
 
With respect to rising wage inequality in developed countries, two main explanations have been 
put forward in the literature.  The first is based on the familiar Hechscher-Ohin theory which 
predicts that trade expansion will lead to a contraction of the import-competing sector, which, in a 
developed country, is the sector that uses unskilled labor more intensively.  Consequently, the 
demand for unskilled labor will fall, so will the relative wage of the unskilled.   The second 
explanation is that technology development has exhibited a bias against the use of unskilled labor, 
leading to a decline in the relative demand for unskilled labor, thus lowering their relative wage.   
There is considerable debate over the magnitude or importance of the trade effects relative to skill-
biased technology.  Some believe the trade is a main source of the widening gap between skilled 
and unskilled labor (see for instance, Thurow, 1992, Leamer 1996).  Others argue that 
technological development is a more plausible cause of the decline in the relative position of the 
unskilled (see for instance, Bound and Johnson, 1992, and Berman et al, 2004).  Despite the 
disagreement over the magnitude of the trade effects, there seems to be a consensus over the 
direction of the trade effects, namely, that trade has the effect of increasing wage inequality in 
developed countries (Wood, 1997).     
 
With respect to wage inequality in developing countries, the Hechscher-Ohin theory predicts that a 
trade expansion will reduce wage inequality.  This is because following a trade expansion, the 
export sector, which is intensive in unskilled labor, will expand, as a result the relative demand for 
unskilled labor will increase, leading to a rise in the relative wage for the unskilled.  However this 
prediction is not borne out in reality.   Empirical studies have found that while wage inequality has 
fallen in some developing countries, it has risen in others.    For instance, Das (2002) finds that 
wage inequality has increased in Mexico and Chile, but decreased in the Philippines, Singapore 
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Columbia, Costa Rica and Argentina, though fell in Malaysia and the Philippines.   Wood (1997) 
also reports that while the East Asian experience was in line with the Hechscher-Ohin theory’s 
prediction of falling inequality in developing countries, the experience in Latin American presented 
a challenge to that conventional wisdom.   According to Wood, when openness increased, wage 
gap narrowed in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, but widened in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Uruguay and Mexico. 
 
What may be the reasons behind rising wage inequality in developing countries?  Feenstra and 
Hanson (1995) suggest that rising wage inequality in Mexico was linked to an increase in foreign 
direct investment.  They construct a model in which a growth of the relative capital stock in the 
South will raise the critical ratio dividing the Northern and Southern activities.  The activities 
transferred from the North to the South is unskilled labor-intensive by Northern standards but 
skilled labor-intensive by Southern standards, therefore the transfer raises relative demand for 
skilled labor in both countries.  Inspired by Feenstra and Hanson (1995), Zhu and Trefler (2005) 
conjecture that the trends in wage inequality across developing countries can be explained by 
changes in trade patterns triggered by technological catch-up.  In their model, technological catch-
up by the South causes production of the least skill-intensive Northern goods to migrate South 
where they become the most skill-intensive Southern good, thereby increasing wage inequality in 
both countries.   There are other explanations of rising inequality in developing countries.  Notably, 
Either (2005) points to the complementarity between equipment and skilled labor, that is, when a 
developing country imports equipment, the demand for skilled labor also increases.   Beaulieu et 
al. (2004) hypothesize that the removal of trade barriers can raise the relative price for high-tech 
products, which can cause greater wage inequality in both countries through the Stolper-
Samuelson channel.  
 
Building on the existing literature, this paper aims to make two contributions.  Firstly, it develops 
two general equilibrium models that examine the impact of international outsourcing (outsourcing 
for short hereafter) on wage inequality in both the developed country and the developing country.   
Both models have the following two features: 
1.  Due to positive transaction costs associated with outsourcing, there is a trade-off between 
transaction costs savings and gains from outsourcing.  Consequently outsourcing is 
endogenously determined in both models, that is, outsourcing occurs in equilibrium only 
when the gains from outsourcing outweigh the transaction costs associated with it.  
2.  Each model considers two general equilibrium trade structures: a structure with trade in 
only final goods, and a structure with trade in both final and intermediate goods.  This 
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from the impact of trade in final goods. 
 
The second contribution of this paper is to offer an explanation for why outsourcing may increase 
wage inequality in some developing countries, while decrease it in others.  Our first model 
assumes symmetry in production technology in developed and developing countries, and predicts 
that outsourcing will decrease wag inequality in the developing country because the outsourced 
intermediate good is intensive in unskilled labor.  In comparison, our second model assumes 
asymmetry in production technologies for the intermediate good.  Specifically, we assume that the 
intermediate good is produced with unskilled labor in the developed country but produce with 
skilled labor in the developing country.  This assumption is a variation of Feenstra and Hanson’s 
(1995) assumption that activities migrated to the South are unskilled labor-intensive in the North 
which becomes skilled labor-intensive in the South.  With the assumption of asymmetric production 
technology, outsourcing by the developed country will lower the relative demand for unskilled labor 
in the developed country and raise the relative demand for skilled labor in the developing country, 
thereby increasing wage inequality in both countries.  
 
In the following, we first present Model 1 with symmetric production functions in both countries, and 
discuss the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality.  Then we present Model 2 with asymmetric 
production functions and explain how outsourcing may increase wage inequality in the developing 
country.  The main results of the paper are summarized in the concluding section.  
 
2.   MODEL 1: A MODEL WITH SYMMETRIC PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Consider a world economy consisting of a developed country, country 1, and a developing country, 
country 2.  Each country is endowed with skilled workers Lis and unskilled workers Liu (i = 1, 2).  
Migration between countries is prohibitively expensive.   There are two final goods, Y and Z, and 
an intermediate good X which is used in the production of Good Y. 
 
2.1.   Consumer decision 
There are two types of consumers in each country, the skilled-worker and the unskilled-worker.  An 
individual consumer is assumed to be endowed with one unit of labor which is sold for a wage.  
The consumer uses the wage to buy the two final goods Y and Z from either the domestic market 
or the foreign market.  The decision problems for the two types of consumers in country i are, 
respectively 
Max:  uis = (yi + yji)
α (zi+ zji) 
1-α  
s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
 + pizzi + pjzzji
 = wis  
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Max:  uiu = (yi + yji)
α (zi+ zji) 
1-α  
s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
 + pizzi + pjzzji
 = wiu  
where uis and uiu are the utility levels of the skilled-worker and the unskilled-worker in country i, 
respectively; yi and zi are the respective quantities of final goods Y and Z, purchased from the 
domestic market in country i;  yji
 and zji are the respective quantities of the good Y and Z imported;   
piy and piz
 are the prices of good Y and Z in country i.  
 
If the price of an imported final good is lower, the consumer will buy imports; otherwise he/she will 
buy domestically.  The decisions of consumers in both countries will determine the direction of trade 
flow in final goods.   For example, if the price of good Y is lower in country 1, than consumers in 
country 1 will buy good Y domestically and consumers in country 2 will import good Y. 
 
2.2.   Producer decision 
There may be up to three types of firms in a country each producing good Z, Y and X respectively.  
Each firm’s decision problem is to choose the quantity of production to maximise profit.  In addition, 
a Y-producing firm will decide whether to buy the intermediate good X domestically or to outsource 
it from another country.  If it chooses to outsource, it will incur a transaction cost.  Thus it will 
outsource good X only if the domestic price of good X is higher than the cost of outsourcing 
including the transaction costs.   
 
The production technologies for the three goods Z, Y and X are as follows.  Final good Z is a 
traditional good and is produced with both skilled and unskilled labor.  The production function of 




where  Liuz and Lisz are the respective amounts of unskilled labor and skilled allocated to the 
production of good Z in country i.   
 
Final good Y is a more sophisticated good and is produced with skilled-labor, unskilled labor and 






where xi is the quantity of the intermediate good X purchased domestically and xji is the quantity of 
good X imported; Liuy and Lisy  are the respective amount of unskilled and skilled labor used in 
producing good Y; ti is the transaction efficiency coefficient for outsourcing good X by a Y-
producing firm in country i.   The specification of the transaction efficiency coefficient assumes that 
the outsourcing firm incurs an iceberg transaction cost, that is, for each unit of intermediate good X 
outsourced, the firm only receives ti,  a proportion 1-ti is lost in transition.   The size of the 
  5transaction efficiency coefficient may be determined by a variety of factors, including search costs, 
transport costs, and the nature of the tariff regime.  
 
The intermediate good X is produced with unskilled labor only.  The production function for an 
intermediate good in country i is  
xi = aixLiux 
where Liux is the amount of unskilled labor used in producing good X.   
 
2.3.   Equilibrium trade structures 
The consumers’ decision on whether or not to import a final good combined with the Y-producing 
firms’ decision on whether or not to outsourcing determine the structure of trade.  We consider two 
possible trade structures: (1) structure (XY)Y(Z)Z where country 1 produces both good X and good 
Y and exports good Y, and country 2 produces and exports good Z;  (2) structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ where 
Y-producing firms in country 1 outsource good X to produce good Y and exports good Y, and 
country 2 produces and exports good X and good Z.   
 
In both trade structures, the developed country, country 1, exports the more sophisticated good Y 
and the developing country exports the traditional good Z.   There is only trade in final good in 
structure (XY)Y(Z)Z, and there are both trade in final goods and international outsourcing in 
structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  Either structure can emerge as the general equilibrium structure under certain 
conditions (i.e., within certain defined parameter subsets).   In the following, we solve the 
equilibrium prices for each structure and identify the corresponding parameter subsets within which 
each structure is the general equilibrium structure.  
 
First we solve for the equilibrium prices for structure (XY)Y(Z)Z.  In this structure, consumers in 
country 1 buy good Y domestically and import good Z; consumers in country 2 import good Y and 
buy good Z domestically.   Thus the representative consumer's decision problem simplifies to:  
Country 1:   Max:  
1
11 2 1 uy z
α α − =  
s.t.     11 22 1 1 yz py pz w +=
Country 2:   Max:  
1
21 2 2 uy z
α α − =     
s.t.  11 2 22 2 yz py pz w + =  
where wi = wiu for an unskilled worker, and  wi = wis for a skilled worker, i = 1, 2.
 



























On the supply side of structure (XY)Y(Z)Z, firms in country 1 produce good X and good Y, and firms 
in country 2 produce good Z.  The decision problems for the representative firm producing each 
good are: 
(1) Y-producing firm in country 1: 
1, 1 1
1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 , max
uy sy
yy yu y s y x u u y s xL L s y p axLL px wL wL
βδ β δ π
−− =− − − . 
(2) X-producing firm in country 1: 
1
1 111 11 max
ux
x xxu x uu x L p aL wL π =−  
(3) Z-producing firm in country 2:
22
1
22 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 , max
uz sz
zz z u z s z u u z s LL s z p aL L wL wL
γγ π
− =− −  
 
In equilibrium, both consumers’ utility and firms’ profits are maximised, and all markets clear.  The 
market clearing conditions are: 
Market for good Y:  
1 11 11 22 22
11 1 1
11
() ( ) uu ss uu s s
yu y s y
yy
wL wL wL wL
axLL
pp
β δ β δ α α − − ++
+=  
Market for good Z:  
1 11 11 22 22
22 2
22
(1 )( ) (1 )( ) uu ss uu s s
zu zs z
zz
wL wL wL wL
aL L
pp
γ γ α α − − +− +
+=  
Market for good X:   11 1 x ux x aL =  
Market for unskilled labor in country 1:  11 ux uy u 1 L LL + =  
Market for skilled labor in country 1:   11 sys L L =  
Market for unskilled labor in country 2:   22 uz u LL =  
Market for skilled labor in country 2:    22 szs LL =  
 
Solving the consumers and the firms’ decision problems, and applying the market clearing 
conditions, we obtain the general equilibrium prices for structure (XY)Y(Z)Z.  These are summarized 
as follows:
*  



























































11 1 1 (1 ) yy x s pa a w
β βδ β δ β δ βδ βδ
−− − − + − − − =− −
11 1
22 2 2 (1 ) zz u s pa w w , 
− γ γγ γ γγ
−− − =−
                                                
,   
 
* If a good is not produced in a country, there is no domestic price for that good.  We have therefore 










= (shadow price),  
1
22 2 2 2 (1 ) yy x u s pa a w w
1 1 β βδ β δ β δ β δ βδ βδ
− −−− + − +− − =− −  (shadow price),   
11
11 1 (1 ) zz s pa w
1 γ γ γγ
−− − − =−
γ  (shadow price).  
 
Following a similar procedure, we can solve the general equilibrium prices for structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ.   
These are summarised as follows.  















































= (shadow price),  
11
11 2 1 1 (1 ) yy x s
1
2 u p aat w w
β ββ δ β δ β δ β βδ βδ
−−− − − + − − − =− − ,  
11
11 1 (1 ) zz s pa w
1 γ γ γγ
−− − − =−










= ,  
1
22 2 2 2 (1 ) yy x u s pa a w w
1 1 β βδ β δ β δ β δ βδ βδ
−− − − + − + − − =− −  (shadow price),  
11




γ − −− =−
− . 
 
2.4.   Conditions for general equilibrium 
In the above we have obtained the equilibrium prices for structure (XY)Y(Z)Z and structure 
(Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  For either of the structure to emerge in general equilibrium, certain parameter 
conditions must be met.  In other words, each structure can be the general equilibrium structure 
only within a specific parameter subset.  We derive the parameter subsets for the two structures 
below.  
 
Essentially the parameter subsets are defined by consumers’ decision to buy domestically or to 
import, and by firms’ decision to buy intermediate inputs domestically or to outsource.  A consumer 
will only import if the price in the other country is lower, and a firm will only outsource if the price of 
the intermediate input in the other country is lower after the transaction costs associated with 
outsourcing are taken into account.  Thus, for structure (XY)Y(Z)Z to emerge in equilibrium, it has to 
be true that the price of X (after transaction costs are taken into account) and the price of Y are 
lower in country 1, and the price of Z is lower in country 2.    Similarly for structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ to 
emerge in equilibrium, it has to be true that the price of Y is lower in country 1, and the price of X 
(after transaction costs are taken into account) and the price Z are lower in country 2.  Thus for 
each structure to be the general equilibrium structure, the corresponding conditions presented in 
Table 1 must be met.   
  





















< >>  
 
If we substitute the equilibrium prices into the conditions in Table 1, each set of the conditions 
expressed in parameters then defines the parameter subset within which a corresponding structure 




Table 2:  Parameter subsets for general equilibrium structures 
Structure Price  subspace 
(XY)Y(Z)Z
2 11 22 2
11 1 1
1
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From the above table, we can see that t1 increases, it is morel likely that the conditions will be met 
for structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ to emerge as the general equilibrium structure.  That is, as transaction 
efficiency associated with outsourcing increases due to, for example, improved transport 
technology, and/or lower tariff, it becomes more likely that the general equilibrium structure will 
feature outsourcing.  Indeed, starting from structure (XY)Y(Z)Z without outsourcing, if t1 increases to 
some critical value, the general equilibrium structure will jump to structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  In other 
words, an improvement in transaction efficiency can endogenously induce the emergence of 
outsourcing.   Since outsourcing is endogenously determined in our model, we can explicitly 
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of wage inequality will change if the general equilibrium structure shifts from a structure without 
outsourcing to a structure with outsourcing.   This analysis is presented in the following. 
 
2.5.  The impact of outsourcing on wage inequality 
We assume that an improvement in transaction efficiency has led to a change in the general 
equilibrium structure from structure (XY)Y(Z)Z to structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  Assume further that the 
structural change is caused by the transaction efficiency improvement alone, that is, all other 
parameters remain unchanged.   
 
We use the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labor as a measure of wage inequality.  If the 
ratio increases, wage inequality increases.  Since the improvement in transaction efficiency causes 
the general equilibrium structure to change from one without outsourcing to one with outsourcing, 
the accompanied change in wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labor can be interpreted as 
the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality.   
 
The wage ratios between skilled and unskilled labor in both countries in the two structures are 
presented in Table 3 below.  
  
 
Table 3: Wage ratio between skilled and unskilled 
Structure  Wage ratio between skilled and 
unskilled in country 1 
Wage ratio between skilled and 
















































From the above table, we can see wage ratio increases in country 1 and decreases in country 2 
when economic structure jumps from structure (XY)Y(Z)Z to structure(Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  This suggests that 
outsourcing increases wage inequality in the developed country (country 1) and decreases wage 
inequality in the developing country.  This result is consistent with the prediction of the standard 
HO model.  However the mechanism through which outsourcing affects wage inequality in this 
model is different from that in the standard HO model.    The standard HO model does not explicitly 
introduce outsourcing.   Wage inequality increases in the developed country through the Stoper-
Samuelson mechanism: the wage of skilled labor in the developed country is driven up by the 
increase in the price of the skilled labor-intensive good, and the wage of the unskilled labor in the 
  10developing country is driven up by the increase in the price of the unskilled labor-intensive good.  
Notably prices of traded good are exogenous in the standard HO model.   In contrast, in this 
model, the driving force for the emergence of outsourcing is improvement in transaction efficiency.  
As firms in the developed country choose to outsource the intermediate good which is produced 
with unskilled labor, the relative demand for unskilled labor falls, so does the relative wage for the 
unskilled.  The reverse happens in the developing country which experiences an increase in 
relative demand for unskilled labor and a fall in wage inequality.  Not only prices of traded goods 
but also outsourcing are endogenized in this model. 
 
3.   A MODEL WITH ASYMMETRIC PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS  
In Model 1 we have assumed that the production function for the intermediate good X in the 
developing country is symmetrical to that in the developing country.  In reality, the same product 
may be produced in different ways or by different segments of the labor force in different countries.  
In particular, in a developing country where the labor force is accustomed to producing traditional 
goods, when new opportunities for export open up, it is often the skilled workers who take the 
opportunities.   For example, Feenstra and Hanson (1995) report that when US companies 
outsourced unskilled-labor intensive products from Mexico, these products were produced in a 
skilled labor-intensive fashion in Mexico, suggesting that the production functions for the 
outsourced good are asymmetrical in the US and Mexico.   
 
Based on the insight of Feenstra and Hanson (1995), we propose Model 2, a model with 
asymmetrical production functions for the outsourced intermediate good, to analyse the impact of 
outsourcing on wage inequality. 
 
The setup of Model 2 is the same as that of Model 1.  Specifically, there are two countries, each 
with skilled and unskilled labor endowments.  There are 2 consumption goods: a traditional good Z 
that can be produced with both skilled labor and unskilled labor in each country; and a more 
sophisticated good Y that can be produced with unskilled labor, skilled labor and an intermediate 
good X.  The difference is that, in Model 2, the intermediate good X is produced with unskilled 
labor in country 1, the developed country, but is produced with skilled labor in country 2, the 
developing country. 
 
3.1.   Decision problems for consumers and firms 
Similar to the case in Model 1, consumers choose whether to buy a good domestically or to import 
it, and decide on the quantities of consumption.  The representative skilled and unskilled 
consumers’ decision problems in country i are: 
  11Max:  uis = (yi + yji)
α (zi+ zji) 
1-α  
               s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
 + pizzi + pjzzji
 = wis  
and  
Max:  uiu = (yi + yji)
α (zi+ zji) 
1-α  
                    s.t. piy yi+ pjyyji
 + pizzi + pjzzji
 = wiu  
The notations are the same as those in Model 1.  
 
Firms producing each type of good choose their output levels to maximize profit.  The Y-producing 
firm has also to decide whether or not to outsource the intermediate product X.  If it chooses to 
outsource, a transaction cost will be incurred.  The production functions for final goods are the 
same as those in model 1.  The production functions in country i are:  
Good Z:  zi = aizLiuz
γLisz
1-γ





The production function for the intermediate good X in country 1 is  
 x 1 = a1xL1ux 
whereas the production function for good X in country 2 is  
 x 2 = a2xL2sx 
 
3.2.   General equilibrium structure and conditions 
As in Model 1, we consider two economic structures in Model 2:  structure (XY)Y(Z)Z in which 
country 1 exports Y in exchange for Z and there is no outsourcing; and structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ in 
which country 1 outsource good X to produce good Y, and exports good Y in exchange for good X 
and good Z.    
 
The decision problems for consumers and firms in both structures and market clearing conditions 
are the same as in model 1.  Solving the decision problems and applying the market clearing 
conditions, we obtain the equilibrium prices in both structures as follows. 
Structure (XY)Y(Z)Z : 



























































11 1 1 (1 ) yy x s p aa w
β βδ β δ δ βδ βδ
−− − − + − − =− −
11 1
11 1 (1 ) zz s pa w , 
− γ γγ γγ










= (shadow price),  
1
22 2 2 2 (1 ) yy x u s
1 1 p aa ww
β βδ β δ δ δ βδ βδ
− −−− + − − =− −  (shadow price),   
11




−− − − =−
γ  
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=  (shadow price),  
11
11 2 1 2 1 (1 ) yy x s s pa a t w w
1 β βδ β δ β β β δ βδ βδ
−− − − + − − − − =− − ,  
11
11 1 (1 ) zz s pa w
1 γ γ γγ
−− − − =−












22 2 2 2 (1 ) yy x u
1 1
s p aa ww
β βδ β δ δ δ βδ βδ
−− − − + − − =− −  (shadow price),   
11




−− − − =−
γ .  
 
The conditions under which each of the two structures emerges as the general equilibrium 
structure are determined by the consumers decision on whether to buy a consumption good 
domestically or to import, and by the firms’ decision on whether to buy the intermediate good 
domestically or to outsource.  The conditions are expressed in terms of defined parameter subsets 
within which a structure is the general equilibrium structure.  The parameter subsets are defined in 
Table 4 below.   
 
Table 4.  Parameter subsets for general equilibrium structures 
Structure Parameters  subsets 
(XY)Y(Z)Z
2 11 22 2
11 1 1
1
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γγ γ γ 1
α βδ δ α




















As with Model 1, if the transaction efficiency coefficient t1 increases to some critical value, the 
general equilibrium structure will jump from (XY)Y(Z)Z to (Y)Y(XZ)XZ, and as a result, outsourcing will 
endogenously emerge.   By comparing the wage ratios between skilled and unskilled labor in the 
two structures, we can examine the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality. 
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3.3.   Impact of outsourcing on wage inequality 
As in Model 1, we assume an improvement in transaction efficiency is the sole cause of a shift in 
the equilibrium structure from structure (XY)Y(Z)Z to structure (Y)Y(XZ)XZ.  A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  
structural change, outsource emerges.  The change in the wage ratio between the skilled and 
unskilled labor that accompanies the structural change is therefore interpreted as the impact of 
outsourcing on wage inequality.   The wage ratios between skilled and unskilled labor in both 
countries in both structure are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5:  Wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labor 
Structure  Wage ratio between skilled and 
unskilled labor in country 1 
Wage ratio between skilled and 
















































From the above table, we can see wage ratio increases in both countries as the general 
equilibrium structure shifts from structure (XY)Y(Z)Z to structure Y)Y(XZ)XZ, suggesting that 
outsourcing can increase wage inequality in the developing country as well as the developed 
country.  This result contradicts the prediction of the standard HO model, but is consistent with 
empirical evidence from a number of Latin American countries as reported by Wood (1997).  The 
key driver of this result is asymmetric production technologies for the intermediate good.  Since the 
intermediate good is produced with unskilled labor in the developed country, but is produced with 
skilled labor in the developing country, outsourcing the intermediate good raises the relative 
demand for skilled labor in both countries, thereby increasing wage inequality in both countries.  
There seem to be some evidence that support both the result itself and the reason behind this 
result (see for instance, Feenstra and Hanson, 1995, and Wood, 1997). 
 
4.   CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented two models to study the impact of outsourcing on wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled labor in the developed country and the developing country.  The first 
model assumes symmetric production technologies in both countries, and predicts that outsourcing 
will increase wage inequality in the developed country, but decrease wage inequality in the 
developing country.  This result is consistent with that of the traditional HO model, although the 
mechanism through which outsourcing affects wage inequality in our model is different in that it 
  14highlights that improvement in transaction efficiency can endogenously induce the emergence of 
outsourcing which in turn changes the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor in the trading 
countries, leading to changes in the wage ratio between the two types of labor.  The second model 
assumes asymmetric technologies in the production of the intermediate good and predicts that 
outsourcing can lead to an increase in wage inequality in both the developed country and the 
developing country. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, available empirical evidence seems to suggest that wage 
inequality has increased in some developing countries and decreased in others following increased 
outsourcing activities.  The two models in this paper offer possible theoretical explanations for the 
different outcomes.   
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